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SOCIAL CONCERNS AND CONSISTENCY IN EUROPEAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
Fr. R. van DER MENSBRUGGHE*
Twenty years ago, a survey of European telecommunications offered a
simple, albeit dismal, picture. The industry was characterized by cosy - and
lucrative - collaboration between State authorities, equipment suppliers and
network operators which in turn led to paralyzing mutual dependance and
bloated labour forces. The overall environment produced near absolute
unaccountability and lackluster customer service (surly business attitudes,
stodgy performance records...). Generally speaking, little concern was granted
to affordability, or efficiency in the installation of a simple phone line, let
alone advanced call features. Vast sections of the population had no access to
the telephone network despite a credo in public service.
At the time, the role of the European Union in addressing these
shortcomings verged on the non-existent. Regulation of telecommunications
was to European integration what fast-food is to gastronomy : le degré zéro
(but we shall come back to fast-food later...)1. The first significant European
foray into the regulation of the sector came in 1983 when the Council of
Ministers set up its Senior Official Group on Telecommunications and invited
telecommunications administrations to consult each other with a view to
harmonizing telematic services2. Thereafter, the Commission spread its wings
over the industry, re-discovering Article 86 EC (ex-Article 90), whilst the
Court of Justice adjudicated its first telecoms dispute in 19853.
The drive of European integration, and in particular the aim to complete
the Single Market in the mid-1980s, accelerated the Union’s involvement in
telecommunications. The achievement of this special purpose induced several
well-known phenomena. Most notably, it led to the tearing down of the
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contact the author at the Law Faculty of the University of Namur, 5 Rempart de la Vierge, B-5000
Namur, Belgium, <francois.vandermensbrugghe@fundp.ac.be>.
1 On this topic, see R. BARTHES, « Lecture de Brillat-Savarin », Le bruissement de la langue (Essais
critiques IV), Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1984, pp. 285-306.
2 See Council Recommendation of 12 November 1984 concerning the implementation of harmonization
in the field of telecommunications, O.J., No. L. 298 of 16.11.84.
3 Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 20 March 1985, ECR, 1985-I, pp. 873-892 (commonly known as the
British Telecoms case).
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barriers that shielded telecoms operators for close to a century and the
breaking up of the cosy collaboration mentioned above. One-by-one,
equipment, data communications, mobile telephony, and fixed-line voice
business were pried open. On 1 January 1998, Europe woke up to competition
in all areas of telecoms business. Global alliances were formed (Atlas, Global
One, Concert...), whilst prices tumbled dramatically (notably for long distance
and international rates). Changes were spectacular for State, industry, labour
and users alike. Taken together, they eschew thorough analysis within the
space of a few pages.
The purpose of this paper is to devote particular attention to two
outstanding priorities in Europe’s current telecommunications environment.
The first concerns the requisite level of social protection in a sector which has
seen full liberalisation over a short period of time. The second concerns the
requisite degree of consistency in an environment which has spawned a wealth
— if not overkill — of detailed regulations at the European and national levels
of government.
I. REQUISITE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS POLICY
Over the past decade, the awareness of a requisite social dimension
within Europe’s telecommunications sector largely focussed on the
introduction and development of universal service, a concept that has been
used as a shorthand for a variety of social obligations. Whilst this concept
initially gave cause for concern, if not outright hostility in certain Member
States, it has progressively given way to pragmatic acceptance (1). Flexibility
in the defining of the concept largely explains this smooth evolution although
it harbours certain dangers (2).
1. Only a short while ago, the European Union’s foray into public utility
reform was seen as a free market onslaught directed at entrenched national
values and traditional forms of business organisation. The introduction of
universal service, and its seemingly pale comparison with the French concept
of service public, drew particular criticism4.
                                                
4 See, for example, in France, the reaction of M. CLAUDE et A. PAILLIER : « Il ne s’agit plus du service
public pour les usagers, mais d’un service universel pour les indigents à qui on fait la charité ! », in
« Les services publics et l’Europe : une vraie menace », Le Monde, 21 June 1995; see, in Belgium, the
appeal of the Centrale Générale des Services Publics (C.G.S.P.), « Pas d’Europe sans services
publics », Brussels, 6 June 1996. For transnational studies on this evolution, see Vers un Service Public
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Within two years, resistance to reform had sunk as quickly as it had
flared. In particular, the concept of service public no longer bore the signs of
torment of 1996-1997. A considerable degree of serenity and pragmatism had
meanwhile emerged throughout the Union.
Doubtless, an explanation for the lessened tension between traditional
values and universal service provision lay in the fact that the notions were no
longer viewed as self-exclusive. The French legislator aptly reconciled service
public and service universel in the Law of 26 July 19965. Experience further
showed that the notions could coexist harmoniously in a competitive
environment. Without sacrificing le service public, customer service improved
in France while long distance and international rates fell sharply despite (or
because of) the opening to competition of French telecommunications markets
on 1 January 1998 (and the issuance of more than 60 licences to France
Télécom’s rivals). Meanwhile, the revenue of the dominant operator rose and
the French universal service charge was cut by half6.
The measure of the evolution is noteworthy inasmuch as, until very
recently, the coexistence of the notions seemed unlikely, as partaking in
different ideological sources. They were seen as antithetical, including in the
United States where the notion of universal service originated. By way of
reminder, when the American Department of Justice filed its third antitrust
lawsuit against AT&T in 1974, the company forcefully sustained that its
« traditional corporate goals — universal service and network optimization —
could not be pursued in a fragmented, competitive market. The Bell System’s
role as a universal public utility would be precluded if the Department of
Justice’s prevailed »7. In the opposite direction, partisans of free prices and
free competition contended that universal service need not be taken into
consideration by policy-makers at all. Utmost and exclusive reliance was to be
                                                                                                                                                    
Européen (edited by L. GRARD, J. VANDAMME, and Fr. R. van der MENSBRUGGHE), Paris,
ASPEeurope Editions (collection TEPSA), 1996.
5 See Law No. 96-659 of 26 July 1996, J.O.R.F., 27 July 1996, p. 11384, reproduced in the Recueil
Dalloz Sirey, 1996, pp. 355-367. The Belgian legislator followed suit in December 1997 : see Law of
19 December 1997, Moniteur belge, 30 December 1997, p. 34986 (see in particular Article 24 which
replaces Article 82 of the Law of 21 March 1991, relating to the reform of certain economic
enterprises).
6 The Autorité de régulation des télécommunications (hereafter, ART) first estimated that the universal
service charge, i.e., the charge levied on the country’s private sector operators to compensate France
Télécom for its obligation to provide a universal service, would amount to FF. 4.8 Billion (740 Million
Euros) in 1999 (see J.O.R.F., 5 January 1999). Several weeks later, further to tariff rebalancing by the
incumbent operator, the telecommunications regulator cut the universal charge by half, in effect
amounting to FF. 2.7 Billion. See D. BX. « Le montant du service universel divisé par deux en 1999 »,
Les Echos, 11 February 1999.
7 P. TEMIN and L. GALAMBOS, The Fall of the Bell System, A Study in Prices and Politics, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 166.
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placed on the antitrust responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice. Even today, prominent American authors favour
unleashed competition. Thus Peter Huber for whom « [e]xperience teaches
that the most universal hamburger — the Big Mac — was supplied by the
market. The best and most universal meat in Moscow today is served under
golden arches, not the red flag »8. Notwithstanding, the American legislator
soon came to consider that telecommunications services could not be regarded
as ordinary commodities (or hamburgers...) to which competition rules alone
should apply. Market failure and the impossibility of the market to self-correct
itself led to the consideration — and legislative consecration — of requisite
social obligations.
These two self-exclusive positions — faith in the virtues of a natural
monopoly to preserve social concerns, or outright competition — permeated
European debate in the 1980s-1990s. There also existed the entrenched belief
in the virtues of cross-subsidies as a constituent element in the furtherance of
network diffusion. Conversely, staunch competitive rhetoric also occupied
certain — mainly British -—spirits. It soon became apparent, however, that
markets should be opened and that special attention should be afforded to
consumers, small producers, and potential new entrants in order to protect
them from welfare losses and mandate equality. A report delivered by the
British Department of Trade and Industry in 1998 illustrates this realism :
« [c]ompetition is a key means of ensuring value and choice for all consumers.
But we must make sure that, for these essential services, the benefits of
competition do not go disproportionately to the better off, and that poorer
consumers are protected »9. In characteristic fashion, pragmatism came before
theory. Telecommunications policy implied a requisite social dimension in the
U.K. and beyond.
Community institutions themselves never embraced the idea of
immediate and ruthless imposition of liberalisation policies upon the
telecommunications industry. From the start of Europe’s interest in utility
services, preference was given to a gradual and consensual approach with
marked social concerns. The social dimension that underlies these services,
and the gradual approach towards liberalisation, was acknowledged at a very
early stage by the European Parliament. As early as 1984, it recognized the
« vital public service obligations of telecommunications administrations, and
                                                
8 P. HUBER, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace. Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule the
Telecosm, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 140-141.
9 A Fair Deal for Consumers : Modernising the Framework for Utility Regulation, March 1998,
available at : <http://www.dti.gov.uk/urt/fairdeal/part1.htm>, point 1.15. See also T. PROSSER,
« Theorising Utility Regulation », 62 Modern Law Review 196 (1999).
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[further stated that it did] not believe that deregulation on the American model
could be applied within the Community »10. The European Commission also
underscored the social dimension of telecommunications in its Green Paper of
1987 on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications
Sevices and Equipment11.
Meanwhile, cross subsidies were tested under EC competition rules, and
in particular the doctrine concerning predation (i.e. the doctrine according to
which a dominant undertaking in one market is prevented from using its
market power to offer predatory prices in another market). Predatory practices
were viewed as either violating Article 82 (ex-Article 86)12 or Article 87 (ex-
Article 92) EC. At the same time, the access/interconnection issue, along with
the concept of essential facilities, were seen as preferred alternatives and
promoted to further network diffusion13.
Various rulings delivered by the European Court of Justice nevertheless
endorsed a gradual and pragmatic approach to these issues. Cross-
subsidization was accepted inasmuch as there were convincing economic and
financial arguments to justify the exclusion of competition. The Article 86(2)
exemption (ex-Article 90(2)) could apply if cross-subsidies were the only
means of ensuring the necessary economic conditions for a firm entrusted with
public service obligations14.
Whilst this approach was being taken, Community institutions improved
their communication, reiterating their neutral attitude towards privatization
(referring to Article 295 EC, ex-Article 222), and recalling the Commission’s
sparse usage of Article 86(3) EC (ex-Article 90(3)) : since 1958, only eight
directives plus amendments and seven decisions have been based on this
Article, and most received the unanimous support of the Member States within
the Council. The Maastricht Treaty itself took care to avoid misunderstandings
in the context of this evolution, providing in Article 16 EC (ex-Article 7d)
                                                
10 European Parliament, Resolution of 3rd March 1984 [Report of the European Parliament on
telecommunications in the Community, Doc. 1-477/3].
11 European Commission, Towards a Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper on the Development of
the Common Market for Telecommunications Sevices and Equipment, Brussels, 30 June 1987,
COM(87) 290 final. See in particular pp. 66-67.
12 See Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak II, [1996] ECR II-826, paras. 147-151; Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak II,
[1996] ECR I-6007, paras. 39-44.
13 An increasing body of literature exists on the concept of essential facilities. In Belgian law (with a
detailed overview of European law), see E. VEGIS, « La théorie des ‘essential facilities’ : genèse d’un
fondement autonome visant des interdictions d’atteinte à la concurrence ? », Revue de droit
commercial belge, 1999, pp. 3-21.
14 See the well-known cases : Case C-320/91, Corbeau, [1993] ECR I-2533; Case C-393/92, Almelo,
[1994] ECR I-1477; Cases C-157/94, Commission v. Netherlands, C-158/94, Commission v. Italy, C-
159/94, Commission v. France, and C-160/94, Commssion v. Spain, [1997] ECR I-5815.
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that : « [...] given the place occupied by services of general economic interest
in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and
territorial cohesion, the Community and the Member States, each within their
respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take
care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions which
enable them to fulfil their missions ».
The Commission’s Communication of September 1996, Services of
General Interest in Europe, further lifted confusion and softened resistance to
change15. Adopted in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference of
1996, the document’s principal aim was to dissipate the perceived tension
between public service goals and the pursuit of liberalisation in utility
services. Specifically, the Communication sought to allay concerns over
employment and economic and social cohesion, asserting in its opening
paragraph that « [s]olidarity and equal treatment within an open and dynamic
market economy are fundamental European objectives ». The Commission
offered definitions of four key concepts (services of general interest, services
of general economic interest, public service, and universal service) and
addressed five sectors, i.e. telecommunications, postal services, transport,
electricity and broadcasting. The mixing of conceptual reflexion and concrete
applications quickly dashed the lobbying efforts of the European Parliament
and special interest groups to amend the EC Treaty on these issues16.
Generally speaking, it constituted a welcome effort at clarifying the Union’s
commitment to a balanced combination of competitiveness and social
concerns.
2. Unarguably, flexibility in the defining of universal service was
instrumental in allaying worries with respect to national values and traditional
forms of business organisation. Notwithstanding, flexibility in this domain
constitutes both an asset and a danger for Europe.
In its Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe, the
Commission provided for periodic reviews of the set of services to be funded
in the context of universal service in line with « technological change, new
general interest requirements and users’ needs »17. The Voice Telephony II
Directive specified this need in its Article 3118.
                                                
15 European Commission, Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(96) 443 final of 11.09.1996.
16 Concerning the European Parliament’s lobbying efforts in this direction, see Resolution of 17 May
1995, adopting the Bourlanges/Martin Report, A4-0102/95/Part I.A. See in particular §10(xi).
17 European Commission, Services of General Interest in Europe, op. cit. (note 15), point 29.
18 Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the
application of open network provision and on universal service for telecommunications in a
competitive environment, O.J., No. L 101 of 1.4.98.
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Transposing these provisions, German legislation provides an
interesting example of such review in §17(2) of the Telecommunications Act
(TKG) :
 « (2) The federal government shall be empowered to designate as a
universal service, [...] telecommunications services in accordance
with §17(1) sentences 2 and 3 herein. Such designation shall be
adapted to technical and social developments in line with demand.
[...] »19 (emphasis added).
Like provisions exist in Belgium20 and in France21.
Various remarks may be advanced with respect to these provisions. On
the one hand, flexibility offers potential increased participation, hence
democratization, in the defining of public services and European social values.
On the other, it opens avenues of change that might capture the benefits of a
future Information Society. Finally, it offers a periodic assessment of norms
that is novel in Europe. In large part, it is reminiscent of American sunset
legislation, i.e. the legislative technique that consists in enacting a norm for a
specified period of time, after which reenactment of the norm past the expiry
date is subordinate to an assessment of its usefulness and overall desirability.
Hence, adaptation of the norm is embedded in its very production. The norm
has become quasi-experimental. We are far from the French revolutionary
ideal whereby « L’idée d’un changement possible de législation était écartée
comme un scandale et l’abrogation d’une loi [était] regardée comme une
mesure tout à fait exceptionnelle »22. The evolution is striking. It arguably
reveals the transition from one type of society to another where legal
dogmatism is past and where norms are produced in an ongoing process of
collective negotiation23.
Flexibility in the European approach to these matters was further
apparent in the Commission’s assertion that that there « [was] nothing to
                                                
19 Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) of 25 July 1996, BGBl I, pp. 1120 et seq., reproduced in
Telekommunikationsrecht : Zweisprachige Ausgabe (dt./engl.) mit Einführung (edited by H. SCHÄFER),
Köln, RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 1998, pp. 17-138, p. 42.
20 See Article 26 of the Law of 19 December 1997 (which replaces Article 84 of the Law of 21 March
1991), Moniteur belge, 30 December 1997, op. cit. (note 5).
21 See Article L. 35-7 of the the Law No. 96-659 of 26 July 1996, op. cit. (note 5).
22 G. BURDEAU, « Essai sur l’évolution de la notion de loi en droit français », Archives de philosophie du
droit, Tome 9, Paris, Sirey, 1939, pp. 7-55, p. 16. According to Jacqueline de ROMILLY, referring to
the Locrians : « Quiconque propose une loi nouvelle le fait la corde autour du cou. La proposition
paraît-elle louable et utile, l’auteur se retire, la vie sauve. Sinon, on serre la corde, et c’est la mort », in
La loi dans la pensée grecque, Paris, éd. Les Belles Lettres, 1971, p. 204.
23 For extended discussion on this topic, see J. CHEVALLIER, « Vers un droit post-moderne ?  Les
transformations de la régulation juridique », Revue du droit public, No. 3-1998, pp. 659-690.
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prevent the Member States from defining additional general interest duties
over and above universal service obligations, provided that the means used
comply with Community law »24.
What exactly is the role of subsidiarity in this picture25 ?  Traditionally,
the avenue of approach of European Community institutions in these matters
is narrow : we are not here in an area of exclusive Community competence.
Accordingly, consistency in these matters depends on the goodwill of Member
States. The success of Community rules depends almost entirely on the
Member States which transpose, implement, and enforce these rules. The
record is far from brilliant. According to a recent European Commission
report on Economic and Structural Reform in the EU (Cardiff II),
telecommunications and transport currently stand out as two of the worst areas
for non-transposition of directives (the others include public procurement and
intellectual and industrial property)26.
Generally speaking, subsidiarity may constitute a grave danger to the
telecommunications sector inasmuch as it leads to the emergence of different
industry structures throughout Europe with different competitive models27.
The funding of universal service is a case in point. Member States may levy
supplementary charges on regular interconnection charges or they may finance
universal service obligations through a universal service fund. They may also
do nothing at all. The growing divergence of universal service obligations may
lead to non-transparency which itself « will act to some extent as entry
barriers for cross-border operators and will increase market fragmentation »28.
Under the circumstances, it is imperative to rein in the subsidiarity
principle to meet the Single Market criterion and other Treaty obligations, for
example the need to ensure a « high level of consumer protection » (dealt with
in Title XIV EC (ex-Title XI)).
                                                
24 European Commission, Services of General Interest in Europe, op. cit. (note 15), point 30.
25 Article 5 EC (ex-Article 3b). For extended developments, see T. SCHILLING, « Subsidiarity as a Rule
and as a Principle, or : Taking Subsidiarity Seriously », Harvard Law School, 1995,
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/groups/jmpapers/schill/index.html>. See also L. IDOT, « L’application
du principe de subsidiarité en droit de la concurrence », Recueil Dalloz Sirey, 1994, pp. 37-44.
26 European Commission, Economic and Structural Reform in the EU (Cardiff II), Brussels, 17.02.99,
COM(1999) 61 final, p. 10.
27 See J.B.K. RICKFORD, « Change, politics and determinist economics in Europe », Telecommunications
Policy, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 471-482, p. 481 (1998). See also the opinion of J.-M. CHEFFERT, E. COUNE,
and L. LECOCQ in « Principes régissant la politique de service universel : une relecture des solutions
belge et européenne », Cahiers du CRID, No. 15, Brussels, Story-Scientia, 1999, pp. 51-85 :
« Paradoxalement, nous avons montré que la liberté d’action des États souffre d’une place trop grande
faite à ce principe [de subsidiarité]... » (p. 84).
28 T. KIESSLING and Y. BLONDEEL, « The EU regulatory framework in telecommunications »,
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 22, No. 7, pp. 571-592, p. 590, 1998.
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The need to check subsidiarity in order to ensure both competitiveness
and solidarity cannot be neglected in the telecommunications sector. If
network industries make up a mere 5% of EU GDP and employment, « their
economic importance is [...] greater because the price and quality of their
outputs is essential for the growth and competitiveness of European industries,
for the operation of the Internal market and for the European consumers’
living standards. [...] The regulatory regime of some of these sectors can also
affect the functioning of TENs which are vital for the integration of European
product markets »29. The need to ensure regulatory consistency is also of
paramount importance.
II. REQUISITE REGULATORY CONSISTENCY
A wealth of change has taken place over the past twenty years with a
spawning of regulations at the national and European levels of government,
the setting up of national regulatory authorities, the formation of global
alliances, etc. As mentioned above, change has affected everyone. A by-
product of this change has been to observe vast extremes - or lack of
consistency in Europe’s current telecommunications landscape. The issue may
be taken under various angles.
A first level of inconsistency may be seen in the powers vested in
national regulatory authorities themselves. As such, it is not possible to
systematize these powers throughout the European Union. They are specific to
each Member State, and vary accordingly. It should suffice to point out that a
streak of ambiguity is inherent in them. On occasion, this ambiguity has been
deliberate and non-problematic : thus with the U.K. where OFTEL was given
a large array of loosely specified powers (eg. setting price caps and
performance standards). In other Member States, on the other hand, the
ambiguity was unintentional and has already given rise to problems. Thus with
France where the Law of 26 July 1996 provides that regulatory authority in
the telecommunications sector is shared by the Minister in charge of
telecommunications and the national regulatory authority for
telecommunications, the ART. Soon after the ART was installed, the obscure
wording of this provision led to a dispute which focussed on France’s
numbering plan and the authority of the ART to attribute telephone prefixes.
Challenged in court, the French Conseil d’État in this instance upheld the
regulatory powers of the regulatory authority. Whilst this particular instance
                                                
29 European Commission, Economic and Structural Reform in the EU (Cardiff II), op. cit . (note 26), p.
12.
CAHIERS DU CRID — N° 16434
may be viewed as a ‘victory’ for the telecoms regulatory authority, the French
government subsequently sought to avoid similar problems when defining the
scope of powers to be vested in the Commission de régulation de l’électricité
(CRE)30. A minimum degree of consistency in the powers of European
regulatory authorities would overcome these disparities and their wide-ranging
effects.
A second level of inconsistency concerns the jurisdictional problems
that may result from the coexistence of sector-specific and competition rules.
Conflicts in subject-matter jurisdiction are bound to emerge. By way of
illustration, Article L. 36-8 of the French Posts and Telecommunications Code
provides that the ART has jurisdiction to resolve disputes involving
interconnection refusals, or the conclusion or execution of interconnection or
telecommunications network access agreements. This being the case,
interconnection is by its very nature embedded with considerations in
competition law, hence possible conflicts with France’s competition
watchdog, le Conseil de la concurrence.
Another issue of concern has to do with the delicate - and often
neglected - problem of conflicts in territorial jurisdiction. Such conflicts
would seemingly arise between regulatory authorities alone31. The problem
will become ever more present in the telecommunications sector. Noteworthy
in this respect is the recent filing by the French telecommunications operator
of a request for arbitration with the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce in a dispute with Deutsche Telekom
AG32.
Consistency may be improved in various manners. We have already
mentioned the limits to be assigned to subsidiarity. General provisions on
transborder disputes in the telecommunications sector would also be welcome.
European texts generally offer liitle guidance on transborder disputes. There is
                                                
30 See Article L 32-1° of the French Posts and Telecommunications Code. See C.E. 26 June 1998, AXS
Télécom et Esprit Télécom France, AJDA, 1998.636; see also S. RODRIGUES, Services publics et
services d’intérêt économique général dans la Communauté européenne, Thesis, Paris, University of
Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), 1999, Vol. II, pp. 474-475.
31 Articles 81 (ex-Article 85) and 82 (ex-Article 86) EC judge anticompetitive conduct by the effects
produced on intra-EU trade. National law may judge the same anticompetitive conduct as to the effects
produced on domestic trade. Concurrent application of national and Community law is nevertheless
envisageable. According to the Court of Justice « [...] conflicts between the rules of the Community
and national rules in the matter of the law of cartels must be resolved by applying the principle that
Community law takes precedence » : see Walt Wilhelm, ECJ, Feb. 13, 1969 ECR 1, 14-15; 1969
CMLR 100, 119. For extended discussion, see W.D. BRAUN, F. RAWLINSON, and L. RITTER, EEC
Competition Law, Deventer-Boston, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991, pp. 36 et seq.
32 See K.J. DELANEY, « Telecom Spat Shines Light on Arbitrator », The Wall Street Journal, 19 May
1999.
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of course the conciliation procedure of Article 26 of the Voice Telephony II
Directive (aforementioned) but its competence is limited. Two recent
Directives concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and
natural gas are noteworthy in these matters33. Article 21(3) of the latter
Directive provides that « [i]n the event of cross-border disputes, the dispute
settlement authority shall be the dispute settlement authority covering the
system of the natural gas undertaking which refuses use of, or access to, the
system. Where in cross-border disputes, more than one such authority covers
the system concerned, the authorities shall consult with a view to ensuring that
the provisions of this Directive are applied consistently ».
Without going so far in the immediate future, a way to overcome
inconsistency lies in cross-border coordination among different national
regulatory authorities and with the European Commission. Fortunately, such
coordination has already begun in Europe. In its Fourth Report on the
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, the
Commission states that regulatory authorities « are exchanging information on
a systematic basis with each other and with the Commission »34. The ONP
Committee constitutes a noteworthy forum where representatives of national
regulatory authorities for telecommunications gather regularly, under the
chairmanship of the European Commission, to discuss and decide issues
which fall under its remit.
Coordination could go further. Examples may be found abroad. Thus in
the United States where regulatory authorities gather annually within the
organization of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC). Founded in 1889, the objectives of this quasi-governmental
nonprofit organization consist in « [...] the promotion of uniformity of
regulation of public utilities and carriers by the several commissions, the
promotion of coordinated action by the commissions of the several States to
protect the common interests of the people with respect to the regulation of
public utilities and carriers, and the promotion of cooperation of the
commissions of the several States with each other and with the Federal
commissions represented in the Association » (emphasis added)35. Often
                                                
33 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning
common rules for the internal market in electricity, O.J., No. L 27/20, 30/01/1997 (see in particular
Article 20(4)); Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, O.J., No. L 204, 21/07/1998.
34 Commission, Fourth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package,
COM(98) 594 of 25 November 1998.
35 NARUC Constitution, Article II, reproduced in P. RODGERS, The NARUC Was There : A History of
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, NARUC, 1979, Washington D.C.,
Appendix N.
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ignored in Europe, the NARUC has played a invaluable educational role,
providing State commissions with technical assistance and policy research on
regulatory issues. It has also prepared and introduced important pieces of
Federal legislation, among which the Federal-State Communications Joint
Board Act of 197336. A noteworthy application of this Act may be found in the
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service which is in charge of
recommending the definition of the services that are supported by Federal
universal service support mechanisms in telecommunications37.
Finally, a way to improve consistency would be to require
simplification and avoidance of unnecessary regulatory burdens on business,
whether at the European or at the national level. This has begun in Europe
with the SLIM initiative (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market),
currently in its third phase. By virtue of this approach, outlined in the Action
Plan for the Single Market and endorsed by the Amsterdam European Council
in June 1997, concrete suggestion have appeared in a certain number of fields
to simpify Single Market rules (VAT, legislation on fertilisers, combined
nomenclature for external trade, construction products, etc.). A suggestion put
forward for the banking sector, i.e. an invitation to national and EU authorities
imposing reporting requirements to avoid duplication, could be transposable to
the telecommunications sector. Similar initiatives exist in various Member
States. Further measures could be taken via developments such as those
adopted in the United States at the federal level38 or at the State level39. These
include laying down a set of substantive principles for all administrative
agencies, including a commitment to cost-benefit analysis.
                                                
36 P. RODGERS, The NARUC Was There..., op. cit., p. 37.
37 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). The Law amended the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C., sect. 151 et seq. See in particular 47 U.S.C. Sect. 254(a)(1)
and Sect. 254(c)(1).
38 President Ronald REAGAN adopted two Executive Orders (maintained by Presidents George BUSH and
Bill CLINTON) that profoundly modified the adoption of federal regulations : see Executive Order No.
12291, 3 CFR 128 (1981), reprinted in 5 USC §601 note (1988). See also Executive Order No. 12498,
3 CFR 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 USC §601 note (1988). For extended discussion on recent regulatory
reform in the United States, see R.H. PILDES and C.R. SUNSTEIN, « Reinventing the Regulatory State »
(1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review, pp. 1-129.
39 See, for instance, Executive Order No. 20 adopted by Governor George E. Pataki of New York on 30
November 1995. The Order established the position of State Director of Regulatory Reform and an
office known as the Governor’s Office of Regulatory Reform (GORR). Various criteria are laid down
in the Order by which the GORR is to judge proposed rules offered by Executive branch
administrative agencies. GORR may authorize publication of the rule in the State Register or require
specified changes be made before publication, or it may prohibit the publication of the rule entirely.
This power to prohibit publication effectively blocks a proposed rule from promulgation. The Order
was challenged as unconstitional but was nevertheless upheld by the N.Y. Court of Appeals (New
York’s highest court) on 6 May 1999 : see Rudder v. Pataki, 99 N.Y. Int. 0067, available at :
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/I99_0067.htm>.
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 437
FINAL REMARKS
Requisite social concerns and consistency made up the principal threads
of this paper. As such, our survey of these issues presented but a partial
glimpse of the many threads that have been woven together in Europe’s
telecommunications industry over the past twenty years. As mentioned above,
the state of the market, the position of telephone users, and the level of
regulation bears little ressemblance with the picture offered in 1979 : a variety
of factors have contributed to connecting the sector with efficiency,
affordability, and general customer satisfaction.
In this paper, we welcomed the Union’s pragmatic and gradual bringing
together of social concerns and market opening. Ensuring their continued
presence remains vital. Whilst the world has largely become prey to sole
economic considerations, Europe’s role in these matters has become ever
more important. This includes the preservation of its own interests but also of
those of developing countries. The Union should play a greater role within the
framework of the World Trade Organisation to help define consistent
universal service obligations on a worldwide scale whilst maintaining
transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral industry structures.
Pure sovereign considerations are difficult to maintain in an environment
which knows no borders. Interests in this domain are interdependent.
This paper also welcomed various regulatory novelties, notably the
periodic reviews of the set of services to be funded in the context of universal
service, and the promise of increased participation, hence democratization, in
the defining of public services and European social values.
As yet, change should not be precipitated much further in institutional
terms. In the first place, current regulatory authorities and regulatory laws in
the Member States need to be given a chance before proceeding further.
Important areas of change have yet to be fully implemented. Whilst a
European regulator is envisaged today, it would be unwise, at the present
stage, to advocate the necessity, role, and responsibilities of a strong,
centralised regulator at the European level other than to ensure hub-like
coordination between national regulators40. As mentioned several times in this
paper, consistency and coordination should constitute Europe’s present-day
goals.
                                                
40 See on this subject the Draft Final Report on the Possible Added Value of a European Regulatory
Authority for Telecommunications, prepared by Eurostrategies and Cullen International, for the
European Commission, September 1999. The report was placed on the server of the Information
Society Project Office (ISPO), September 8, 1999 : <http://www.ispo.cec.be/news.html>
CAHIERS DU CRID — N° 16438
In addition, change cannot be considered as an end in itself. It is to be
welcomed if greater — and better — public participation in the administrative
process is truly fostered and the democratic deficit mitigated. Naturally,
citizen participation in the decision-making process could be enhanced
through traditional means such as representation by Offices of Consumer
Advocates. Particular attention should be drawn however to today’s
opportunities to associate users of public utilities (i.e. all citizens) within the
regulatory process. As such, users may be associated in the rule-making
process itself, via on-line advertising of rule-making, the on-line solicitation of
public comments, or on-line availability of public comments. Many such
changes have already taken hold in the United States and are beginning to
blossom in Europe. They can, and should be, developed further. Were these
practices to be generalized, users’ rights and their relationship to both
regulatory authorities and their public utilities would be improved
significantly. We believe these practices would enhance much-needed open
debate and public analysis of European utilities.
Change is to be welcomed if good administration and adequate
telecommunication services are provided to all. The enhancement of
government and industry transparency as well as the furtherance of equality
among the citizenry of Europe remain ever more important requisites.
